A small argument for a relational epistemology: things have the ability to be known – if things didn’t have the ability to be known, we couldn’t know about them. We have the ability to know – without this, we couldn’t know. But one of these without the results in no knowledge – each must exist in relation with the other for there to be true knowledge. By coming into a relation with the object, we come to know the object directly – we know the thing in itself.
Call it relational realism. We know the thing in itself, have direct access to the object of our knowing, by being in a relation to/with it.
This is far from complete – but I think there is some potential here.
How would you answer the advocate of a metaphysical theory of vagueness; that the thing-ness that defines a particular object is too vague for us to accurately refer to it?
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This is an iPhone reply – so forgive me if it’s not a well developed reply. I’d say that the problem with MV is that it postulates an unnecessary dualism by abstracting its essence from its existence – when, like Duns Scotus said, the primary object of the intellect is being.
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